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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The State argues that no proof of evidence was made by the
defendant/appellant to support a finding of standing. Appellant asserts that
evidence does exists to support the conclusion that the property was the
appellant's and she does have an expectation of privacy and thereby standing to
question the legality of the officer's stop and search. Further, appellant argues
that the State is estopped from asserting such arguments when the trial counsel
below agreed that the property was the appellant's.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS RE: STANDING
The State concedes that the Officer had no reasonable cause to search
neither the car nor its occupants. However, State seeks to deny the effectiveness
of their previous stipulation entered into the by County Attorney.
The trial court found that the passenger did not have standing to assert
the illegality of the search due to her 'passenger' status. The issue was not
whether the container was her property or not but the trial court denied standing
due to her 'passenger' status. See Court's ruling. The basis for such reasoning is
that since she was the passenger (not the driver) she had no standing to question
the search. The trial court further found that she had abandoned her personal
property (lip balm) upon exiting the car upon command of the officer.
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At the motion to suppress hearing, the Court questioned whether the
container belonged to the defendant. Defendant cited the provisions of the
preliminary hearing transcript, which the officer acknowledged that the
container was the defendant/appellant's. It is reported as follows:
Q. Did you ask Ms Bissegger for permission to search that?
A, No, I didn't
Q. Were you aware that that item was Ms. Bissegger's and not Mr.
Cassin's?
A. The plastic container.
Q. Yes.
A. Yes.

(T. 14 L. 10 - L. 17)

The State of Utah and the defendant through their respective attorneys
signed a 'Stipulation of Facts'. The State of Utah— via the Utah County
Attorney's office— agreed to the statement of facts.
The stipulation provides in relevant parts regarding standing as follows:
Driver Kassuhn agreed but limited to the search for open containers.
Kassuhn did not consent to either the search of the defendant passenger
nor her property. The defendant was not approached for consent to
search the car, herself nor her property. . . .
The officer ordered defendant out of the car. Upon being so ordered,
she (appellant) got out of the car but left some of her personal items in
the car including a small opaque 'Carmax' container. The container was
located on the front dash of the car. (T. 6 L. 19. T.6 L. 2 5 . ) . .
As the defendant exited the car (the driver being already out of the
car), the officer commenced his search. However, the officer looked into
a small opaque carmax (lip balm) container. The officer knew that the
container belonged to the defendant passenger. The container is
approximately Vi inch in diameter and % inch in depth.
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Further, the Court concluded that the officer acknowledged the container
to be the defendant's. See Court's ruling.
The Court then concluded that the defendant did not have standing to
object to the search of her own property and that she abandoned the property by
leaving it behind. *This is in contravention to the officer testimony that he commanded
her to step out of the car.
The trial court's findings were as follows relating to standing:
The officer stopped the car for an observed expired registration violation.
Defendant was a passenger in the car and was asked to get out of the car to allow
the search for open containers. The officer noted a Carmex container
approximately V2 inch in diameter and 3A inch in depth. It was left on the
dashboard. The contents could not be opened without unscrewing the lid and
looking inside. The officer assumed it belonged to the defendant passenger.
Based on the above findings, the Court concluded that the defendant, as a
passenger did not have standing to assert any objections that the driver may
have had to search of the car. Further, the Court concluded that when the
defendant left the car she abandoned the container by leaving it behind. She had
not reasonable expectation of privacy in the container.
In final analysis, the trial court found that the defendant did not have
standing due to her passenger status and she abandoned the property.
The State via the County Attorney agreed that the property was the
defendant/appellants. The officer conceded that Officer knew the property to be
the defendant/appellant's. This was not a contested fact at the trial level.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The defendant has standing to assert Fourth Amendment and Article I
Section 14 rights. She was a passenger in the vehicle that was stopped. She had an
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expectation of privacy in her property she was forced to leave inside the car per the
command of the officer.

A passenger has an expectation of privacy in stopping a car.

Further, she has an expectation of privacy in her personal property.
ARGUMENT
STANDING TO ASSERT FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS

Since the decision in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507,19
L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), it has been the law that "capacity to claim the protection of
the Fourth Amendment depends . . . upon whether the person who claims the
protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
invaded place. Guests in a home were found to have standing to object to the
search of a friend's home. See Minnesota v. Olsen, 495_U.S_91 (1990); State v.
Rowe, 806 P.12d 730 (Ut. Ct. App. 1991) rev. on other grounds, 850 P.2d 427 (Utah
1992)
Passengers in cars have been found to have standing. United States v.
Sowers, 136 F.3d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 1998). Even passengers in taxicabs have been
found to have standing. U.S. v. Woodrum, 202 F.3d 1 (1 st Cir. 2000); See Rios v.
United States, 364 U.S. 253, 261 (1960).
Here, a young female that is forced to get out of the car. Operating
under this command, she left her personal property inside the car, including thE
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small Carmax lip balm container. The officer searched her personal property
including the lip balm container, knowing it to be the passenger's.
ESTOPPEL
Yet the State argues that she has no expectation of privacy in her
recognized personal property. The State is estopped from taking such a
position. The State, via the Utah County Attorney, agreed at the trial court level
to the following:
The defendant passenger was waiting for the officer's investigation to be
terminated so that she and her boyfriend could be on their way.,..
The officer ordered defendant out of the car. Upon being so ordered, she
got out of the car but left some of her personal items in the car including
a small opaque 'carmax' container. The container was located on the front
dash of the car.
As the defendant exited the car (the driver being already out of the car),
the officer commenced his search. However, the officer looked into a small opaque
carmax (lip balm) container. The officer knew that the container
belonged to the defendant passenger. The container is approximately Vi
inch in diameter and % inch in depth.
(Emphasis Added)
The State of Utah is bound by their agreements. The Attorney General is
bound by the acts of the trial attorney. The trial attorney had the authority to
agree to the stipulated facts to forego a full evidentiary hearing.
Further, the facts set out in the preliminary hearing find that the officer
knew the property to be that of the defendant/appellant. The trial court agreed

concluding that the officer assumed that the property was the
defendant/appellant's. This is bolstered by the fact that the State of Utah
through their agents agreed that the container was the property of the
appellant's.

But now, the State seeks to escape such agreements made by their

agent.
Defendant submits that the State is estopped from making such
arguments.
CONCLUSION
1. Factually, the defendant via proof at the preliminary hearing, the
stipulation of the State of Utah has provided uncontested facts to support the
finding that the defendant/appellant had an expectation of privacy in her
personal property.
2. The State of Utah is estopped from making an argument contrary to
their agreements and stipulations entered into at the trial court level.
Dated this 27 th day of March, 2003.
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State of Utah,

:
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:

Ruling on Motion to Suppress
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:

Date: March 25,2002

Lacy Bissegger,

:

Case Number: 011404652

:

Division I: Judge James R. Taylor

Defendant

This matter came before the Court on March 1, 2002 for hearing on the Defendant's
Motion to Suppress Evidence. The Court, ruling from the bench, denied the motion. Counsel for
the Defendant has prepared and submitted a "Ruling on Motion To Suppress & Findings" which
has been approved as to form by counsel for the State. The Court is, nevertheless, uncomfortable
with the articulation of the findings and conclusions in the submitted "Ruling " The Court,
therefore, makes and enters the following findings and ruling. The Court is sensitive to the desire
of counsel to include facts deemed crucial to any anticipated appeal and, therefore, will entertain
any reasonable request to supplement this document.
Facts
On November 5, 2001 Provo Police Officer Wolken stopped a car westbound on Center
Street for the observed violation of expired registration. No other criminal violation was noted
or suspected before the stop. After the stop, at the driver's window, the officer noted an odor of
alcohol from the driver's breath. The driver was removed from the car and asked to perform field
Page 1 of
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sobriety tests, which he passed. The officer concluded that there was not a DUI violation at that
point. Because of the odor, the officer did wish to search the car for an open container of alcohol
and asked for permission to conduct such a search. The driver denied that there were open
containers in the car. Although there is a dispute as to whether the driver gave permission, gave
and then revoked permission, or didn't give permission at all this Court specifically declined to
determine that issue since the Defendant was not the driver and does not have standing to assert
that issue.
The Defendant, who was a passenger in the front right seat of the car, was asked to get
out of the car to allow the search for open containers. As the Defendant got out of the car the
officer noticed a small, opaque container (a "Carmex" (brand of lip balm) container approximately
V2 inch in diameter and 3/4 of an inch in depth) on the dashboard which he hadn't seen before
when looking in the car The content ofhhc container could a u be determined

MLA,UI

unscrewing the lid and looking inside. The officer assumed that the container was connected to
the Defendant because of where it was and when it had become apparent.. The officer opened the
centainer and discovered methamphetamine which is the basis of the charge in this case. No open
containers of alcohol or other source for the odor of alcohol were located during the search.
Both the driver and the Defendant were over age 21 at the time.
Ruling
This Court concluded that the Defendant, as a passenger, did not have standing to assert

Page 2 of

4

any objections the driver may have had to the fact or the scope of the search of his automobile
The Court concluded that when the Defendant left the vehicle she abandoned the container, if it
was hers, by leaving it behind In that posture the Court concluded that she had no reasonable
expectation of privacy and, therefore, could not object to the search of the container by the
officer
The Defendant's motion to suppress is denied
Dated this 25th day of March, 2002

A certificate of mailing is on the following page
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY, OREM DEPT.
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)
AGREED STATEMENT
STATE OF UTAH,
)
OF FACTS RE: SUPPRESSION
)
RULING
Plaintiff,
)

vs.

)

LACY BISSEGGER
Defendant.

CASE NO. 011404652

)
)
—ooOoo—

Defendant motioned this Court to suppress evidence herein. Defendant asserted
that the officers herein conducted an illegal search of the defendant, her property, and the
automobile of which she was a riding as a passenger.
The defendant asserts that the arrest/search of the defendant and her property by
officers herein was in violation of the defendants constitutional rights granted to the
defendant by the United States Constitution and the Utah State Constitution.
The Court's ruling is based on the following findings:
The date of the stop, search and arrest is November 5, 2001 at the hour of 10:39
p.m. The location of the stop is westbound Center Street, Provo, Utah.
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As the defendant exited the car (the driver being already out of the car), the officer
commenced his search. However, the officer looked into a small opaque carmax (lip
balm) container. The officer knew that the container belonged to the defendant
passenger. The container is approximately V2 inch in diameter and % inch in depth.
At hearing, the officer testified that he knew that the container did not contain any
open containers. The officer could not see inside the small container and could not tell
what, if anything, was inside until unscrewing the top and looking inside.
The officer opens the defendant's small carmax container and located
methamphetamine, which is the basis of this charge.
The officer(s) found no open containers in the car. No evidence was located to
substantiate the officer's reported detection of alcohol.
Dated this

day of July, 2002.

Approved:
David Clark
Utah County Attorney Office

Attorney for Defendant
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1

that small object?

2

A.

No.

3

Q.

So at that point you decided to expand your search

4
5
6

into looking inside the container?
A.

Right.

Because it looked like it possibly had

methamphetamine in it, a powdery substance.

7

Q.

8

narcotics?

Could it have been any substance other than

A.

It could have.

Q.

Did you ask Ms. Bissegger for permission to search

that?
A.

No, I didn't.

Q.

Were you aware that that item was Ms. Bissegger's and

not Mr. Cassin's?
A.

Ir.e ?las:i: ccn:a:::e-

Q.

Yes.

A.

Yes.

Q.

You thought it was Ms. Bissegger's?

A.

Yes.

Because it wasn't there when I first contacted

1 the veh:Lcle.
Q.

And when you asked for consent to search the vehicle

through Mr. Cassin, you asked him if you could search for open
containers?
A.

I just asked if I could search the vehicle.

0.

Did you ask for any identification from Ms.
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